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.For how few of our past actions are there, of which we haveany memory? Who can tell me, for instance, what were his thoughts andactions on the 1st of January 1715, the 11th of March 1719, and the 3rd ofAugust 1733? Or will he affirm, because he has entirely forgot theincidents of these days, that the present self is not the same person withthe self of that time; and by that means overturn all the most establishednotions of personal identity? In this view, therefore, memory does not somuch produce as discover personal identity, by shewing us the relation ofcause and effect among our different perceptions.'Twill be incumbenton those, who affirm that memory produces entirely our personalidentity, to give a reason why we cm thus extend our identity beyond ourmemory.The whole of this doctrine leads us to a conclusion, which is of greatimportance in the present affair, viz.that all the nice and subtilequestions concerning personal identity can never possibly be decided,and are to be regarded rather as gramatical than as philosophicaldifficulties.Identity depends on the relations of ideas; and these relationsproduce identity, by means of that easy transition they occasion.' But asthe relations, and the easiness of the transition may diminish byinsensible degrees, we have no just standard, by.which we can decideany dispute concerning the time, when they acquire or lose a title to thename of identity.All the disputes concerning the identity of connectedobjects are merely verbal, except so fax as the relation of parts -gives riseto some fiction or imaginary principle of union, as we have alreadyobserved.What I have said concerning the first origin and uncertainty of ournotion of identity, as apply'd to the human mind, may be extended withlittle or no variation to that of simplicity.An object, whose different co-existent parts are bound together by a close relation, operates upon theimagination after much the same manner as one perfectly simple andindivisible and requires not a much greater stretch of thought in order toits conception.From this similarity of operation we attribute a simplicityto it, and feign a principle of union as the support of this simplicity, andthe center of all the different parts and qualities of the object.Thus we have finish'd our examination of the several systems ofphilosophy, both of the intellectual and natural world; and in ourmiscellaneous way of reasoning have been led into several topics; whichwill either illustrate and confirm some preceding part of this discourse,or prepare the way for our following opinions.'Tis now time to return toa more close examination of our subject, and to proceed in the accurateanatomy of human nature, having fully explain'd the nature of ourjudgment and understandings.SECT.VII.Conclusion of this Book.But before I launch out into those immense depths of philosophy, whichlie before me, I find myself inclin'd to stop a moment in my presentstation, and to ponder that voyage, which I have undertaken, and whichundoubtedly requires the utmost art and industry to be brought to ahappy conclusion.Methinks I am like a man, who having struck onmany shoals, and having narrowly escap'd shipwreck in passing a smallfrith, has yet the temerity to put out to sea in the same leaky weather-beaten vessel, and even carries his ambition so far as to think ofcompassing the globe under these disadvantageous circumstances.Mymemory of past errors and perplexities, makes me diffident for thefuture.The wretched condition, weakness, and disorder of the faculties, Imust employ in my enquiries, encrease my apprehensions.And theimpossibility of amending or correcting these faculties, reduces mealmost to despair, and makes me resolve to perish on the barren rock, onwhich I am at present, rather than venture myself upon that boundlessocean, which runs out into immensity.This sudden view of my dangerstrikes me with melancholy; and as 'tis usual for that passion, above allothers, to indulge itself; I cannot forbear feeding my despair, with allthose desponding reflections, which the present subject furnishes mewith in such abundance.I am first affrighted and confounded with that forelorn solitude, in whichI am plac'd in my philosophy, and fancy myself some strange uncouthmonster, who not being able to mingle and unite in society, has beenexpell'd all human commerce, and left utterly abandon'd anddisconsolate.Fain wou'd I run into the crowd for shelter and warmth;but cannot prevail with myself to mix with such deformity.I call uponothers to join me, in order to make a company apart; but no one willhearken to me.Every one keeps at a distance, and dreads that storm,which beats upon me from every side.I have expos'd myself to theenmity of all metaphysicians, logicians, mathematicians, and eventheologians; and can I wonder at the insults I must suffer? I havedeclar'd my disapprobation of their systems; and can I be surpriz'd, ifthey shou'd express a hatred of mine and of my person? When I lookabroad, I foresee on every side, dispute, contradiction, anger, calumnyand detraction.When I turn my eye inward, I find nothing but doubt andignorance.All the world conspires to oppose and contradict me; tho'such is my weakness, that I feel all my opinions loosen and fall ofthemselves, when unsupported by the approbation of others.Every step Itake is with hesitation, and every new reflection makes me dread an errorand absurdity in my reasoning [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]