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. 106 Deployment wasproposed at 16 sites, 10 of them existing Stage 1 and Stage 1½ Bloodhound sites.Remotely controlled, some sites might be unmanned.Complete or partial protectionwould be provided for all 9  Class 1 airfields, 16 Thor IRBM sites107 and 7 US airbases.The deployment plan was based on being able to deal with six threats at a time.Thiswould require six warhead trackers in Holland and eight boost trackers in southernEngland, plus five Blue Yeoman early warning sets.An initial operational date of 1963 depended on the availability of the Blue Yeomanradars.R&D costs were estimated at £1.46 million, principally for the missile, computerand early warning radar, and deployment costs totalled just £12.5 million in addition tothat already planned for defence against the winged threat.Some US aid was hoped for,as defence of US airfields in Britain was included in the scheme.In view of the highEarly efforts at active defence 71degree of automation, manpower demands would be small and later additions to the planinexpensive as the most costly item, the Blue Yeoman early warning radar, would notneed to be augmented.It was considered thatthis proposal should provide a worthwhile development of presentlyplanned defence systems and extend their useful time scale nearer to thedeployment of any more sophisticated ABM system.The additional R&Dand deployment costs involved would amount to only a small fraction ofthe total costs envisaged to deal with the manned winged threat.Meanwhile, Bristols and RAE Farnborough were considering the use of the Skylarkmeteorological research rocket for ABM purposes, and were producing an outline designfor a Mach 10 hypersonic interceptor.108 RAE also cast doubt on the plan submitted byRRE, noting the optimistic assumptions about threat and defence performance, and that ifthe proposed system had to deal with a winged threat at the same time as ballisticmissiles, a larger number of trackers and launchers would be required.It was alsouncertain that the command guidance version of Red Duster would be suitable, or whatcoverage areas might result.109 In view of the subsequent four decades of US experiencein developing missile defences, this pessimism seems justified.However, RRE replied tothese criticisms in detail, explaining the assumptions made in the proposal.110 Thisexchange was reflected by Cockburn when he observed that opinions varied from thosewho thought it would be impossibly expensive to those who thought it so vital it must bepursued at all costs.111The Ministry of Supply drew up a detailed proposal for further research,112 in responseto a request by the DRPC.It opened by stating:Although an adequate solution to the operational problem cannot yet beenvisaged the lines along which a solution may be achieved have beendefined.Further progress will only be achieved by experimental workinvolving the development of equipment&The proposals take account, and are complementary to, workproceeding in the United States&It was noted that the Americans were working on  above atmosphere intercept, whilstthe UK, with shorter warning times, wanted to make use of  atmospheric effects (i.e.decoy discrimination after re-entry).The requirement was assumed to be the defence ofsmall areas (deterrent bases) against a multiple decoy threat.Research should beconcentrated on a discriminating radar, electronic (as opposed to mechanical) scanningand the design of an interceptor test vehicle.A five-year programme was addition to asubstantial intra-mural (RRE and RAE) effort, which could proposed, with £10 millionallocated for extra-mural (industrial) work in only be at the expense of other projects.Cockburn stated to the DRPC that  we were not quite sure where we wanted to go butunless we studied the problem we should not go anywhere.He felt that in about twoyears time it might be possible to determine whether an ABM system was feasible.113One member of the Committee wondered whether they were not becoming obsessed withthe decoy problem [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]